Larry Donald Budge (Rhodes 1961)
U.S. Army Major General. National Intelligence Officer, CIA. U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Rhodes Scholar, University of Oxford. National War College.
Member Association United States Army, American Association Rhodes Scholars, Army-Navy Club, Army-Navy Country Club.[2]
3 Aug 1992 - Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs: Deposition Larry D. Budge (Rhodes 1961)[3]
LBD: I can’t tell you whether it [MIA POW list] was transmitted electronically or whether someone brough it back with them. But I know we received it, we received a set or a copy. I’m not sure that there were comments when we recieved the list. But I know later on, during the Four Party, during the two months of the Four Party Joing Military Commission, there was some discussion that there were probably people on the, people not on the list that we had some, that the intelligence community had some inkling might still be alive, or had been seen alive. I believe General Woodward at one time told us that there was, and I believe it was Kissinger who went to Hanoi during the period and had raise the names of some other who were not on the list.[3]
Exhibt No. (6), Message 291830, from the Four Party Joint Military Commission on the 29th of January, 2nd page states that “The U.S. Representative opened the session by deferring issues of identification until a later time when the chiefs of the DRV and PRG delegations would be present here with their delegations.” He also cited the incomplete POW lists given to the U.S. in Paris which did not include U.S. prisonsers in Laos.[3] … LDB: The second was, if I remember correctly there was an agreement made, and I believe it’s in Aldrich memorandum, at Paris, between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, which said that the North Vietnamese would be responsible for returning the prisoners held by the Pathet Leo. That was not part of the agreement, but it was an off the record kind of thing. That may have been the other reason why we raised that. As far as how vociferiously it was raised, I can’t, I can’t really, it doesn’t stand out as anthing that we haggled over for a great deal of time.[3,p13]
Exhibt No. (7), Aldrich memorandum, which is his interpretation of the agreement [side agreement between Dr. Kissinger and Le Due Tho, that the North Vietnamese would be responsible for the prisoners in Laos]. LDB: I believe we had a copy. I’m almost sure we had a copy of this.[3]
Exhibt No. (8), summary of the seventh meeting of the Subcommission on PW’s. Did you ever attend any of those subcommissions ? LDB: No. Q: The important of this one is it raises that there’s going to be a release and the DRV announced that there are going to be 28 or 29 sick and wounded? Do you remember…? LDB: No. I’m sure we discussed it, but I can’t recall it.[3,p15]
Exhibit No. (9), it talks about 116 prisoners. Did you have any input into this memorandum, or do you recall it at all. LDB: I don’t really recall this specifically. I’m sure I saw it. but I don’t believe I had, I’, almost positive I wouldn’t have had any input into it, because this was really the folks who went to Hanoi for the exchange. I had tried to go on one of the exchanges, but I never went. So I really did not get directly involved in what went on up in Hanoi.[3,p16]
Exhibit No. (10), document 101730, summary of the delegation meeting for that day. The primary focus is there’s a discussion that less than one-fourth of the prisoners are being released. Was this a problem of staying on target of the 60 days and generally the increment of 25 percent at a time? … [3,p16 - gets into privileges and immunities problems for the Four Party Joint Commission and cease fires.] … LDB: … PRG explained number of U.S. captured personnel to be released. Q: And that number did not equal 25 percent, and that was, that was made an issue. LDB: Uh-huh. Q: And I, again, it’s my undertanding the blueprint was we’re going to do this four increments; we’re going to get roughly 25 percent of the POW’s out at each time, and we’re going to reduce our troop strengths by 25 percent. A: Uh-huuh. Q: So that this will be a systematic with drawal and a systematic release of the POW’s. LDB: I don’t recall this being as big a problem here as it later become. Q: okay. [3,p18]
…
Exhibit No.(14), statement by Ron Ziegler at the White House, Q: Seems to be oe of the first times that we are raising our MIA/body no recovered. Can you recall, was our phasis on POW’s or was it MIA, or was it both ? Exactly whay was our top priorities during thie period of time ? LDB: I think our top priority during this period of time was to get the release of the PW’s. I think part of the problem was in the POW subcommission, we had more delays, as you can see from all the messages and all that . We had more delays than we had really anticipated. Now, theytalked about the MIA/body recovered issue. But fair soon as we got into this, it became obvious that, in order to get through the 60 days and get the POW’s, the live POW’s, back, at the rate we going, it was to be very difficult to do that. I believe the real, we really felt, that the Four Party Joint Military Team, which would stay on, was going to do the MIA/body not recovered, the searching the crash sites and king of thing. It was not, I don’t believe it was. I don’t recall it intentionally being a question of we’ll do POW’s and then we’ll do MIA’s…[3,p25]
…
Since 1989 - Assistant Deputy Chief of staff for personnel, Headquarters Department Army, Washington.[2]
1988 - Advanced through grades to major general, United States Army.[2]
1987 to 1989 - National Intelligence Officer, General Purpose Forces, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington[2]
1985 to 1987 - Assistant division commander, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington.[2]
1984 to 1985 - Deputy director operations, Headquarters Department Army, Washington.[2]
1983 to 1984 - Deputy Director Training, Headquarters Department Army, Washington.[2]
1979 to 1983 - Division Chief of Staff, brigade commander, 1st Armored Division, Federal Republic Germany.[2]
1978 to 1979 - Student, National War College, Washington.[2]
1974 to 1977 - Brigade operations officer, then battalion commander, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado.[2]
Dec 1973 - Became involved in the Paris Peace According (Agreement). Organised a small planning cell. Paul was in the Operations Directorate there, and he was brought into it. then he recruited me…Paul went off to the Paris neogotiations. [3]
1973 to 1974 - Personnel management staff officer, United States Army Military Pers. Center, Alexandria, Virginia.[2]
27 Jan 1973 - Once the Paris Peace Accord were signed, became a member of the Four Party Joint Military Commission on the POW issue-MIA.[3] I was in CORDS, Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support in Saigon in an organization called the Pacification Studies Group, which was a small sort of think tank that worked directly for the Director of Pacification, the Director of CORDS.[3]
Summer 1972 to End of Mar 1973, Vietnam War. [3]
12 Dec 1970 - Married Constance Leighliter. Children: Arthur, Stephen.[2]
1966 to 1967 - First served in Vietnam. 6 months, company commander in First Cavalry Division, and the last seven months, I was the aide to General Westmoreland.[3]
1961 to ? - Rhodes Scholar, Exeter College, University of Oxford.[1] (Master of Arts in Philosophy, Politics and Economics)
1961 - Second in command Lieutenant, United States Army.[2]
1961 - Graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.[1]
Born 24 Jul 1939.
[2] - Prabook.com - Larry Donald Budge (Rhodes 1961)
[4] - National Review - So Now the POW/MIA Flag Is Under Fire — as a Symbol of ‘Racist Hate’
[5] - U.S. National Archives - Larry Donald Budge (Rhodes 1961)
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